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1 Introduction
Philosophers call on possible worlds to perform different kinds of jobs. One of these jobs
is that of explaining what the truth of modal truths and the falsity of modal falsities
consists in. “What does the possibility that p consist in?”, you ask. “It consists in the
existence of a possible world at which p”, someone might reply.
Possible worlds are also used as semantic machinery. The semanticist needs entities
for her quantifiers to range over, and possible worlds—or, more generally, possibilia—can
be used to construct them. One might take a proposition to be a set of possible worlds
(structured or not); one might take the intension of a predicate to be a function that
assigns each world a set of objects in that world (or some complication thereof); one
might use possible worlds to characterize the semantic values of modal operators; and so
forth.
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(It is sometimes assumed that these two jobs are best performed by a single notion
of possible world, as in Lewis (1986). But it is worth keeping in mind that such an
assumption is not mandated. It would be in principle possible to develop two distinct
notions of possible world, one for the foundationalist project and another for the semantic
project.)
The main objective of this paper is to defend the claim that a specialized modal on-
tology is not needed as semantic machinery. (The further claim that it is not needed to
explain what modal truth consists in is defended in chapters 2 and 5 of Rayo (forthcom-
ing).) Some philosophers might be interested in this sort of project because of ontological
scruples. Not me: my own view is that ontology is cheap. I am interested in the project
because I think it helps clarify the role of possible worlds in our philosophical theorizing.
My proposal is an instance of what David Lewis called ‘ersatzism’. I will argue that
the needs of the semanticist can be fulfilled by using representatives for possibilia in place
of possibilia. Although there are other ersatzist proposals in the literature,1 I hope the
machinery developed here will earn its keep by delivering an attractive combination of
frugality and strength.
The proposal is frugal in two different respects. First, it is metaphysically frugal: it
is designed to be acceptable to modal actualists, and presupposes very little by way of
ontology. (I help myself to set-theory, but do not assume a specialized modal ontology,
or an ontology of properties.) Second, the proposal is ideologically frugal: it does not
presuppose potentially controversial expressive resources such as infinitary languages or
non-standard modal operators. The point of developing machinery that presupposes so
little is that philosophers of different persuations can put it to work without having to
take a stance on difficult philosophical issues.
As far as strength is concerned, one gets a qualified version of the following claim:
anything that can be said by quantifying over Lewisian possibilia can also be said by
using the machinery developed here. The result is that the proposal can be used quite
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freely in the context of semantic theorizing, without having to worry too much about
running into expressive limitations. An especially useful feature of the proposal is that it
allows one to enjoy the benefits of quantification over sets of possibilia, which are often
appealed to in the course of semantic theorizing.2
Possible-words-theorists sometimes claim that the same individual exists according
to distinct possible worlds. (There is a world according to which I have a sister who
is a philosopher, and a world at which that very individual is a cellist rather than a
philosopher.) Ersatzist representatives for such worlds might be said to be linked. Much
of the paper will be devoted to the phenomenon of linking. An effective treatment of
linking is crucial to the success of the ersazist program.
2 Possibility
Sadly, I don’t have a sister. But I might have had a sister. In fact, I might have had a
sister who was a philosopher. And, of course, had I had a sister who was a philosopher,
she wouldn’t have been a philosopher essentially: she might have been a cellist instead.
The following is therefore true:3
Sister
♦(∃x(Sister(x,ar) ∧ Phil(x) ∧ ♦(Cellist(x) ∧ ¬Phil(x))))
(Read : I might have had a sister who was a philosopher and might have been
a cellist rather than a philosopher.)
On the most straightforward possible-worlds semantics for first-order modal languages,
Sister will only be counted as true if there are worlds w1 and w2 with the following
properties: according to w1, there is an individual who is my sister and a philosopher;
according to w2, that very individual—as one is inclined to put it—is a cellist rather than
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a philosopher. It is therefore tempting to say the following:
∃x([Sister(x,ar) ∧ Phil(x)]w1 ∧ [Cellist(x) ∧ ¬Phil(x)]w2)
(Read: There is an x such that: (i) according to w1, x is my sister and a philosopher,
and (ii) according to w2, x is a cellist rather than a philosopher.)
But is there anything to make this existential quantification true? A merely possible
sister could do the job. But modal actualists believe there is no such thing. The job
could also be done by an actually existing object who is not my sister but might have
been my sister. (See Williamson (2010).) But the claim that such objects exist would be
a substantial metaphysical assumption—an assumption that it would best to avoid, if at
all possible.
2.1 A Kripke-semantics for Actualists
There is a certain sense in which it is straightforward for an actualist to give an adequate
Kripke-semantics for modal sentences. The trick is to have one’s semantics quantify
over representations of possibilities, rather than over the possibilities themselves. In this
section I will describe one such semantics. It is an elaboration of an idea introduced in
Roy (1995) and further developed in Melia (2001).
Let L be a first-order language, and let L♦ be the result of enriching L with the
sentential operator ‘♦’. An a-world (short for ‘actualist-world’) for L♦ is an ordered pair
〈D, I〉, consisting of a domain and an interpretation function, such that:
• The domain D is a set containing of two kinds of entities. First, it contains every
every ordered pair of the form 〈x, ‘actual’〉, for x an individual in the domain of L.
(These pairs will be used to represent actually existing objects.) Second, it may
contain ordered pairs of the form 〈x, ‘nonactual’〉, where x is some actually existing
individual, set-theoretic or otherwise. (These pairs will be used to represent merely
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possible objects.)
• If c is an individual constant of L and x is its intended interpretation, the interpretation-
function I assigns the pair 〈x, ‘actual’〉 to c. (Accordingly, if ‘Socrates’ is an
individual constant referring to Socrates, I assigns the pair 〈Socrates,‘actual’〉 to
‘Socrates’.)
• I assigns a subset of Dn to each n-place predicate-letter of L, and a function from
Dn to D to each n-place function-letter of L.
The notions of truth and satisfaction at an a-world are characterized along standard
lines, with the proviso that ‘x = x’ is only satisfied at an a-world by objects in the
domain of a-world, with the result that ‘x = x’ can be used as an existence predicate.
See Appendix A for details.
The best way to see how a-worlds are supposed to work is by considering a simple
example. Take the a-world 〈D1, I1〉 from figure 1. The domain of 〈D1, I1〉 consists of the
pairs 〈Agust´ın, ‘actual’〉 (which represents me) and 〈Socrates, ‘nonactual’〉 (which repre-
sents not Socrates, but a merely possible object), and I1 assigns ‘Sister’ a set containing
the pair 〈〈Socrates, ‘nonactual’〉 , 〈Agust´ın, ‘actual’〉〉. The result is that 〈D1, I1〉 makes
‘∃x(Sister(x,ar))’ true, and therefore represents a possibility whereby I have a sister.
(Why use the pair 〈Socrates, ‘nonactual’〉 to represent my merely possible sister rather
than some other pair—〈Plato, ‘nonactual’〉, say? No good reason. Just like one can write
a story according to which I have a sister using any font one likes, so one can define an
a-world according to which I have a sister using any pair 〈z, ‘nonactual’〉 one likes.)
It is useful to compare a-worlds to Lewisian worlds. Like a-worlds, Lewisian worlds
can be thought of as representing possibilities. Here is Lewis:
How does a world, [Lewisian] or ersatz, represent, concerning Humphrey, that
he exists?. . . A [Lewisian] world might do it by having Humphrey himself as
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a part. That is how our own world represents, concerning Humphrey, that
he exists. But for other worlds to represent in the same way that Humphrey
exists, Humphrey would have to be a common part of many overlapping
worlds. . . I reject such overlap. . . There is a better way for a [Lewisian] world
to represent, concerning Humphrey, that he exists. . . it can have a Humphrey
of its own, a flesh-and-blood counterpart of our Humphrey, a man very much
like Humphrey in his origins, in his intrinsic character, or in his historical role.
By having such a part, a world represents de re, concerning Humphrey—that
is, the Humphrey of our world, whom we as his worldmates may call simply
Humphrey—that he exists and does thus-and-so.4
(It is easy to lose track of Lewis’s representationalism because he also subscribed to
a different claim: what it is for it to be possible that p is for there to be a Lewisian
world at which (i.e. representing that) p. For further discussion of these issues, see
section Rayo (forthcoming).)
Whereas Lewisian worlds represent by analogy, a-worlds represent by satisfaction. A
Lewisian world represents the possibility that I have a sister by containing a person who
is similar to me in certain respects, and has a sister. An a-world, on the other hand,
represents the possibility that I have a sister by being such as to satisfy the formula
‘∃x(Sister(x,ar))’.
From the perspective of the Lewisian, an individual with a counterpart in the actual
world represents its actual-word counterpart, and an individual with no counterpart in
the actual world represents a merely possible object. From the present perspective, a
pair of the form ‘〈x, ‘actual’〉’ represents its first component, and a pair of the form
‘〈x, ‘nonactual’〉’ represents a merely possible object (even though the pair itself, and
both of its components, are actually existing objects).
Two representations are linked if—as one is inclined to put it—they concern the
same individual, even if the individual in question doesn’t exist. In order for a Kripke
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〈D1, I1〉
D1 = {〈Agust´ın, ‘actual’〉 , 〈Socrates, ‘nonactual’〉}
I1(‘Philosopher’) = {〈Socrates, ‘nonactual’〉}
I1(‘Cellist’) = {}
I1(‘Sister’) = {〈〈Socrates, ‘nonactual’〉 , 〈Agust´ın, ‘actual’〉〉}
I1(‘ar’) = 〈Agust´ın, ‘actual’〉
〈D2, I2〉
D2 = {〈Socrates, ‘nonactual’〉}
I2(‘Philosopher’) = {}
I2(‘Cellist’) = {〈Socrates, ‘nonactual’〉}
I2(‘Sister’) = {}
I2(‘ar’) = 〈Agust´ın, ‘actual’〉
〈D3, I3〉
D3 = {〈Plato, ‘nonactual’〉}
I3(‘Philosopher’) = {}
I3(‘Cellist’) = {〈Plato, ‘nonactual’〉}
I3(‘Sister’) = {}
I3(‘ar’) = 〈Agust´ın, ‘actual’〉
〈D4, I4〉
D4 = {〈Agust´ın, ‘actual’〉 , 〈Plato, ‘nonactual’〉}
I4(‘Philosopher’) = {〈Plato, ‘nonactual’〉}
I4(‘Cellist’) = {}
I4(‘Sister’) = {〈〈Plato, ‘nonactual’〉 , 〈Agust´ın, ‘actual’〉〉}
I4(‘ar’) = 〈Agust´ın, ‘actual’〉
These examples assume that the only non-logical expressions in L are ‘Philosopher’,
‘Cellist’, ‘Sister’ and ‘ar’, and that the domain of L is {Agust´ın}.
Figure 1: Examples of a-worlds.
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semantics based on a-worlds to verify Sister, there must be linking amongst a-worlds.
In particular, some a-world must represent a possibility whereby I have a sister who is a
philosopher and another must represent a possibility whereby—as one is inclined to put
it—that very same individual is a cellist rather than a philosopher.
Let us first see how linking gets addressed from a Lewisian perspective. l1 and l2 are
Lewisian worlds: l1 contains an individual a1 who bears the right sort of similarity to me
and an individual s1 who is a1’s sister and a philosopher; l2 contains an individual s2 who
is a cellist. Accordingly, l1 represents a possibility whereby my sister is a philosopher,
and l2 represents a possibility whereby someone is a cellist. But nothing so far guarantees
linking. Nothing so far guarantees that—as one is inclined to put it—the individual l1
represents as my sister is the very individual that l2 represents as a cellist. What is
needed for linking is that s1 and s2 be counterparts: that they be similar in the right
sorts of respects.
The same maneuver can be used when it comes to a-worlds. Like the Lewisian,
we shall use counterparthood amongst representations to capture linking. For Lewis,
representations are counterparts just in case they are similar in the right sorts of respects.
From the present perspective, we shall say that representations are counterparts just in
case they are identical (though other ways of defining the counterpart relation could
be used as well). Here is an example. The a-world 〈D1, I1〉 represents a possibility
whereby I have a sister who is a philosopher. Now consider a-worlds 〈D2, I2〉 and 〈D3, I3〉
from figure 1. Each of them represents a possibility whereby someone is a cellist rather
than a philosopher. But only 〈D2, I2〉 is linked to 〈D1, I1〉. For 〈D1, I1〉 and 〈D2, I2〉
both employ 〈Socrates, ‘nonactual’〉 as a representation, and it is this that guarantees
that—as one is inclined to put it—the individual who 〈D1, I1〉 represents as my sister
is the very individual that 〈D2, I2〉 represents as a cellist. On the other hand, since
〈D3, I3〉 represents a possibility whereby someone is a cellist by using 〈Plato, ‘nonactual’〉
rather than 〈Socrates, ‘nonactual’〉, what one gets is that—as one is inclined to put it—
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the individual who 〈D1, I1〉 represents as my sister is distinct from the individual that
〈D2, I2〉 represents as a cellist.
It is important to keep in mind that an a-worlds-semantics is not a way of improv-
ing on the informal characterization of linking that I supplied a few paragraphs back.
(Representations are linked if—as one is inclined to put it—they concern the same indi-
vidual, even if the individual in question doesn’t exist.) In particular, it is not a way of
dispensing with the qualifying phrase ‘as one is inclined to put it’.5 What an a-worlds-
semantics delivers is an (actualistically acceptable) device for representing possibilities,
which enjoys the following feature: it is clear when two representations are to be counted
as linked. The reason this is helpful is that, as we shall see below, much of the theoreti-
cal work that can be carried out by quantifying over possibilities can be carried out by
quantifying over representations of possibilities instead. So an a-worlds-semantics puts
the actualist in a position to get on with certain kinds of theoretical work without having
to worry about giving a proper characterization of linking.
2.2 Admissibility
There are a-worlds according to which someone is a married bachelor, and a-worlds
according to which there might have been a human who wasn’t essentially human. Such
representations need to be excluded from our semantics, on pain of getting the result that
‘♦(∃x(Married(x) ∧ Bachelor(x)))’ or ‘♦(∃x(Human(x) ∧ ♦(∃y(y = x ∧ ¬Human(x))))’
are true. What we need is a notion of admissibility. Armed with such a notion, one can
say that p♦φq is true just in case φ is true at some admissible a-world, and that pφq is
true just in case φ is true at every admissible a-world.6
It is important to keep in mind the distinction between the semantic project of de-
veloping a Kripke-semantics for modal languages, on the one hand, and the project of
accounting for the limits of metaphysical possibility, on the other. A semantics based on
a-worlds is meant to address the former, but not the latter of these projects. Accord-
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ingly, the notion of admissibility that is presupposed by the semantic project should be
thought of as a placeholder for whatever limits on the metaphysically possible turn out
to be uncovered by a separate investigation. (On reasonable assumptions, one can show
that a suitable notion of admissibility is guaranteed to exist wherever the limits turn out
to lie.7) A semantics based on a-words is compatible with different views about how to
fix the limits of metaphysical possibility. One’s account might appeal to a Principle of
Recombination, for example, or to a set of ‘basic modal truths’.8 (My own account is
spelled out in chapters 2 and 5 of Rayo (forthcoming).)
Even if one appeals to an ontology of possible worlds in fixing the limits of metaphysi-
cal possibility, one might have good reasons for using a-worlds rather than possible worlds
for the purposes of semantic theorizing. The easiest way to see this is by distinguish-
ing between sparse and abundant conceptions of possible worlds.9 A sparse conception
countenances worlds according to which there are objects that don’t actually exist, but
not worlds according to which it is true of specific non-existent objects that they exist.
There is, for example, a possible world w1 according to which I have a sister who is a
philosopher and might have been a cellist rather than a philosopher, but no possible
world according to which it is true of the specific individual who would have been my
sister had w1 obtained that she exists. (Not even w1 is such a world, for even though
w1 is a world according to which I have a sister, it is not a world according to which it
is true of some specific individual that she is my sister.) On an abundant conception of
possible worlds, on the other hand, there are possible worlds according to which it is true
of specific non-existent objects that they exist. There is, for instance, a possible world
w2 according to which it is true of the very individual who would have been my sister
had w1 been actualized that she is a cellist rather than a philosopher.
On the sparse conception of possible worlds, the existence of a world is conditional
on the existence of the objects the world represents as existing, in the same sort of
way that the existence of a set is conditional on the existence of its members. Had w1
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been actualized, I would have had a sister, and all manner of sets containing that very
individual would have existed. But as things stand, my sister doesn’t exist, and neither
do sets having her as a member. Similarly—the story would go—had w1 been actualized,
I would have had a sister, and a world according to which that very individual is a cellist
would have existed. But as things stand, my sister doesn’t exist, and neither do possible
worlds according to which she herself exists.
The absence of w2 does not prevent a defender of the sparse conception from using
possible worlds to determine a truth-value for Sister. For, on the assumption that
possible worlds track metaphysical possibility, the existence of w1 is enough to guarantee
that Sister is true. But the absence of w2 does mean that the sparse worlds do not
by themselves deliver the ontology that would be needed to give a Kripke-semantics for
a sentence like Sister. For, as emphasized above, a Kripke-semantics will only count
Sister as true if the range of one’s metalinguistic quantifiers contains both w1 and w2.
Fortunately, a sparse ontology of possible worlds is enough to guarantee the existence
of a notion of admissibility relative to which an a-worlds semantics assigns the right
truth-value to every sentence in the language (see footnote 7). So it is open to the
sparse theorist to use admissible a-words, rather than possible worlds, for the purposes
of semantic theorizing. The upshot is not, of course, that one has done away with one’s
specialized modal ontology, since possible worlds may be needed for the project of pinning
down the crucial notion of admissibility (or for the project of explaining what modal truth
consists in). But by using a-worlds as the basis of one’s semantics, the requirements on
one’s modal ontology are confined to needs of these non-semantic projects.
A related point can be made with respect to mere possibilia. The availability of a-
worlds means that there is no need to postulate mere possibilia (or specialized surrogates,
such as Plantinga’s individual essences) as far as the project of developing a Kripke-
semantics for modal languages is concerned.10
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2.3 Interlude: The Principle of Representation
In previous sections I have made informal remarks about the ways in which a-worlds
represent possibilities. The purpose of this interlude is to be more precise. (Uninterested
readers may skip ahead to section 2.4.)
When 〈D, I〉 is considered in isolation from other a-worlds, anything that can be said
about the possibility represented by 〈D, I〉 is a consequence of the following principle:
Representation Principle (Isolated-World Version)
Let s be a sentence of L, and suppose s says that p. Then:
according to the possibility represented by 〈D, I〉, p
if and only if
s is true at 〈D, I〉.
Accordingly, when considered in isolation from other a-worlds, 〈D2, I2〉 and 〈D3, I3〉 rep-
resent the same possibility. It is the possibility that there be exactly one thing and that
it be a cellist but not a philosopher.
We shall normally assume that L (and therefore L♦) contains a name for every object
in the domain of L. With this assumption in place, the following is a consequence of the
Representation Principle:
Suppose z is in the domain of L. Then z exists according to the possibility
represented by 〈D, I〉 just in case 〈z, ‘actual’〉 is in D.
In particular, one gets the result that none of the objects in the domain of L exists
according to the possibility represented by 〈D2, I2〉 (since p∃x(x = c)q is false at 〈D2, I2〉
for any constant c in L), and that I exist according to the possibility represented by
〈D1, I1〉 (since ‘∃x(x = ar)’ is true at 〈D1, I1〉).
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So much for considering a-worlds in isolation. When they are considered in the context
of a space of a-worlds, linking plays a role. So there is slightly more to be said about
the possibilities that they represent. Let A be a space of a-worlds and let 〈D, I〉 be in
A. Then anything that can be said about the possibility represented by 〈D, I〉 in the
context of A is a consequence of the following principle:
Representation Principle (Official Version)
1. Let s be a sentence of L♦, and suppose s says that p. Then:
according to the possibility represented by 〈D, I〉 in the context
of A, p
if and only if
s is true at 〈D, I〉 in the Kripke-model based on A.
2. Let 〈D∗, I∗〉 be an arbitrary a-world in A. Let p∃x1 . . . xk φ(x1 . . . xk)q
and p∃x1 . . . xk γ(x1 . . . xk)q be sentences of L♦ which say, respectively,
that x1 . . . xk are F and that x1 . . . xk areG. Assume that p∃x1 . . . xk φ(x1 . . . xk)q
is true at 〈D, I〉 in A and that p∃x1 . . . xk γ(x1 . . . xk)q is true at 〈D∗, I∗〉
in A. Then:
as one is inclined to put it, some of the individuals that are F
according to the possibility represented by 〈D, I〉 in the context
of A are the very same individuals as some of the individuals
that are G according to the possibility represented by 〈D∗, I∗〉
in the context of A
if and only if
one of the sequences of pairs that witnesses p∃x1 . . . xk φ(x1 . . . xk)q
at 〈D, I〉 in A is identical to one of sequences of pairs that wit-
nesses p∃x1 . . . xk γ(x1 . . . xk)q at 〈D∗, I∗〉 in the Kripke-model
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based on A.
When A includes both 〈D1, I1〉 and 〈D2, I2〉, the first clause yields the result that, ac-
cording to the possibility represented by 〈D2, I2〉 in the context of A, there is a cellist
who might have been my sister. And the two clauses together yield the slightly stronger
result that—as one is inclined to put it—the individual who is a cellist according to the
possibility represented by 〈D2, I2〉 in the context of A is the very same object as the
individual who is my sister according to the possibility represented by 〈D1, I1〉 in the
context of A.
A consequence of the Principle of Representation is that the possibilities represented
by a-worlds are not maximally specific. Suppose, for example, that the property of tallnes
is not expressible in L. Then the possibility represented by 〈D1, I1〉 is compatible with a
more specific possibility whereby my sister is tall and it is compatible with a more specific
possibility whereby my sister is not tall. On the other hand, the possibilities represented
by a-worlds are maximally specific as far as the language is concerned: one can only add
specificity to the possibility represented by an a-world by employing distinctions that
cannot be expressed in L♦.
The Principle of Representation can be used to determine which properties of an
a-world are essential to its representing the possibility that it represents, and which
ones are merely artifactual. It entails, for example, that 〈D2, I2〉 and 〈D3, I3〉 represent
the same possibility when considered in isolation, so any differences between them are
merely artifactual. In particular, the use of 〈Socrates, ‘nonactual’〉 in 〈D2, I2〉 is merely
artifactual. On the other hand, 〈D2, I2〉 and 〈D3, I3〉 represent different possibilities
when considered in the context of {〈D1, I1〉, 〈D2, I2〉, 〈D3, I3〉}. For whereas according
to 〈D2, I2〉 there is a cellist who might have been my sister, according to 〈D3, I3〉 there
is a cellist who couldn’t have been my sister. So the use of 〈Socrates, ‘nonactual’〉 in
〈D2, I2〉 is essential in the context of {〈D1, I1〉, 〈D2, I2〉, 〈D3, I3〉}. This is not to say,
however, that a possibility whereby there is a cellist who might have been my sister can
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only be represented by an a-world if the a-world contains 〈Socrates, ‘nonactual’〉. For
the possibilities represented by 〈D1, I1〉, 〈D2, I2〉, and 〈D3, I3〉 in the context of {〈D1, I1〉,
〈D2, I2〉, 〈D3, I3〉} are precisely the possibilities represented by 〈D4, I4〉, 〈D3, I3〉, and
〈D2, I2〉, respectively, in the context of {〈D4, I4〉, 〈D3, I3〉,〈D2, I2〉}.
When I speak of the possibility that an a-world represents what I will usually have
in mind is the possibility that is represented in the context of the space of all admissible
a-worlds.
2.4 The dot-notation
I would like to introduce a further piece of notation: the dot. The dot is a bit like a func-
tion that takes objects represented to the objects doing the representing. Suppose I am
seeing a play according to which I have a sister; applying the dot-function is like shifting
my attention from a character in the play—my sister—to the actor who is representing
my sister.
Consider the following two formulas:
[F(x)]w [F(x˙)]w
For w a fixed representation, the undotted formula is satisfied by all and only objects
z such that w represents a possibility whereby z is an F ; the dotted formula, on the
other hand, is satisfied by all and only objects z such that z is used by w to represent
something as being an F . Thus, if p is a performance of a play according to which I have
a sister, the actor playing my sister satisfies ‘[Sister(ar, x˙)]p’ but not ‘[Sister(ar, x)]p’
(since the performance uses the actor to represent someone as being my sister, but the
performance does not represent a scenario whereby I have that actor as my sister). And
I satisfy ‘[∃y Sister(x, y)]p’ but not ‘[∃y Sister(x˙, y)]p’ (since the performance represents
a scenario whereby I have a sister, but—unlike the actors and props—I am not used by
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the performance to represent anything).
Now consider how the dot-notation might be cashed out from the perspective of a
Lewisian. Let l1 be a Lewisian world representing a possibility whereby I have a sister.
Accordingly, l1 contains an individual a1, who is my counterpart, and an individual s1,
who is a1’s sister. Now consider the following two formulas:
[Sister(ar, x)]l1 [Sister(ar, x˙)]l1
From the perspective of the Lewisian, no inhabitant of the actual world satisfies the
undotted formula. For no inhabitant of the actual world could have been my sister; so—
on the assumption that Lewisian worlds track metaphysical possibility—no inhabitant of
the actual world is such that l1 represents a possibility whereby she is my sister. The
dotted formula, on the other hand, is satisfied by s1, since she is used by l1 to represent
something as being my sister.
Here is a second pair of examples:
[∃y Sister(x, y)]l1 [∃y Sister(x˙, y)]l1
The undotted formula is satisfied by me, since l1 represents a possibility whereby I have
a sister. But it is not satisfied by a1. For although it is true that a1 has a sister in l1, l1
represents a possibility whereby I have a sister, not a possibility whereby my counterpart
has a sister. The dotted formula, on the other hand, is satisfied by a1, since a1 is used
by l1 to represent something as having a sister (i.e. me). But the dotted formula is not
satisfied by me, since it is only the inhabitants of l1 that do any representing for l1, and
I am an inhabitant of the actual world.
Let me now illustrate how the dot-notation works from the perspective of the modal
actualist, with a-worlds in place of Lewisian worlds. (A detailed semantics is given in
Appendix A.) Here is the first pair of examples (where w1 is the a-world 〈D1, I1〉 from
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section 2.1):
[Sister(ar, x)]w1 [Sister(ar, x˙)]w1
Since I1(‘Sister’) = {〈〈Agust´ın, ‘actual’〉 , 〈Socrates, ‘nonactual’〉〉}, w1 represents a possi-
bility whereby I have a sister who doesn’t actually exist. Accordingly, from the perspec-
tive of a modal actualist, there is no z such that w1 represents the possibility that z is
my sister. So, from the perspective of the modal actualist, nothing satisfies the undotted
formula. The dotted formula, on the other hand, is satisfied by 〈Socrates, ‘nonactual’〉,
since 〈Socrates, ‘nonactual’〉 is used by w1 to represent something as being my sister.
Now consider the second pair of examples:
[∃y Sister(x, y)]w1 [∃y Sister(x˙, y)]w1
Since the pair 〈〈Agust´ın, ‘actual’〉 , 〈Socrates, ‘nonactual’〉〉 is in I1(‘Sister’), w1 represents
a possibility whereby I have a sister. The undotted formula is therefore satisfied by me.
But it is not satisfied by 〈Agust´ın, ‘actual’〉 because w1 does not represent a possibility
whereby any ordered-pairs have sisters. The dotted formula, on the other hand, is satis-
fied by 〈Agust´ın, ‘actual’〉, since 〈Agust´ın, ‘actual’〉 is used by w1 to represent something
as having a sister (i.e. me). But it is not satisfied by me, since it is only ordered-pairs
that do any representing in w1, and I am not an ordered-pair.
2.5 Inference in a language with the dot-notation
The semantics for a-worlds that is supplied in Appendix A guarantees the truth of every
instance of the following schemas:
1. Validity
[ψ]w (where ψ is valid in a negative free logic)
2. Conjunction
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[ψ ∧ θ]w ↔ ([ψ]w ∧ [θ]w)
3. Negation
[¬ψ]w ↔ ¬[ψ]w
4. Quantification
[∃y(φ(y))]w ↔ ∃y([y˙ = y˙]w ∧ [φ(y˙)]w) (where y is a non-world-variable)11
[∃w′(φ)]w ↔ ∃w′([φ]w) (where w′ is a world-variable)
5. Trivial accessibility12
[[φ]w]w′ ↔ [φ]w
6. Identity
[v = v]w ↔ [∃y(y = v)]w
x = y → ([φ(x˙)]w → [φ(y˙)]w)
[x˙ = y˙]w → ([x˙ = x˙]w ∧ x = y)
(where v may occur dotted or undotted)
7. Atomic Predication
[Fnj (v1, . . . , vn)]w → ([v1 = v1]w ∧ . . . ∧ [vn = vn]w)
(where the vi may occur dotted or undotted)
8. Names
[ψ(c)]w ↔ ∃x(x = c ∧ [ψ(x)]w) (for c a non-empty name)
Schemas 2–5 are enough to guarantee that any sentence in the actualist’s language is
equivalent to a sentence in which only atomic formulas occur within the scope of ‘[. . .]w’.
For instance, the actualist rendering of ‘♦(∃x(Phil(x) ∧ ♦(¬Phil(x))))’:
∃w[∃x(Phil(x) ∧ ∃w′([¬Phil(x)]w′))]w
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is equivalent to
∃w∃x([Phil(x˙)]w ∧ ∃w′(¬[Phil(x˙)]w′)).
As a result, the dot-notation allows a language containing the modal operator ‘[. . .]w’ to
have the inferential behavior of a (non-modal) first-order language.
2.6 The expressive power of the dot-notation
In this section we shall see that a suitably qualified version of the following claim is
true: anything the Lewisian can say, the modal actualist can say too—by using the
dot-notation.
Here is an example. The Lewisian can use her mighty expressive resources to capture
a version of the following thought:
Linking
There are possible worlds w1 and w2 with the following properties: according
to w1, there is an individual who is a philosopher; according to w2, that very
individual is a cellist.
It is done as follows:
∃w1∃w2∃x1∃x2(I(x1, w1) ∧ I(x2, w2) ∧ Phil(x1) ∧ Cellist(x2) ∧ C(x1, x2))
(Read: There are Lewisian worlds w1 and w2 and individuals x1 and x2 such
that: (a) x1 is an inhabitant of w1 and x2 is an inhabitant of w2, (b) x1 is a
philosopher and x2 is a cellist, and (c) x1 and x2 are counterparts.)
How might this be emulated by a modal actualist equipped with the dot-notation? Con-
sider what happens when one treats the variables in the Lewisian rendering of Linking
as ranging over (admissible) a-worlds rather than Lewisian worlds, and carries out the
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following replacements:
I(xn, wn) −→ [x˙n = x˙n]wn
Phil(xn) −→ [Phil(x˙n)]wn
Cellist(xn) −→ [Cellist(x˙n)]wn
C(xn, xm) −→ xn = xm
The result is this:
∃w1∃w2∃x1∃x2([x˙1 = x˙1]w1 ∧ [x˙2 = x˙2]w2 ∧ [Phil(x˙1)]w1 ∧ [Cellist(x˙2)]w2 ∧ x1 = x2)
(Read: There are admissible a-worlds w1 and w2 and objects x1 and x2 such
that: (a) x1 is used by w1 to represent something and x2 is used by w2 to
represent something, (b) x1 is used by w1 to represent a philosopher and x2
is used by w2 to represent a cellist, and (c) x1 = x2.)
or equivalently:
∃w1∃w2∃x([Phil(x˙)]w1 ∧ [Cellist(x˙)]w2)
(Read: There are admissible a-worlds w1 and w2 and an object x such that:
x is used by w1 to represent a philosopher and x is used by w2 to represent a
cellist.)
What gives the actualist’s method its punch is the fact that it generalizes: one can
show that there is a systematic transformation of arbitrary Lewisian sentences into dot-
ted actualist sentences which preserves truth-values and inferential conections.13 (See
Appendix B for details.)
The actualist’s transformation-method does not preserve meaning—where Lewisian
sentences quantify over Lewisian possibilia, their actualist transformation quantify over
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a-worlds and ordered-pairs. But meaning-preservation is not what the actualist wants,
since she doesn’t want to countenance Lewisian possibilia. What she wants is a way
of enjoying the theoretical benefits of quantification over Lewisian possibilia within the
sober confines of an actualist framework. Here are two examples of ways in which she is
able to do so:
1. Firstorderizing Modal Sentences
By quantifying over Lewisian possibilia, the Lewisian is able to render any sentence
in the language of first-order modal logic in (non-modal) first-order terms. The
sentence
♦(∃x(Phil(x) ∧ ♦(Cellist(x))))
(read: there might have been a philosopher who might have been a cel-
list),
for example, gets rendered as the (non-modal) first-order sentence:
∃w1∃w2∃x1∃x2(I(x1, w1) ∧ I(x2, w2) ∧ Phil(x1) ∧ Cellist(x2) ∧ C(x1, x2))
And Lewis (1968) shows that it can be done in general.14
The (non-modal) firstorderizability of modal sentences brings two immediate advan-
tages. The first is that it allows one to think of the inferential connections amongst
modal sentences in terms of the inferential connections amongst the corresponding
non-modal sentences; the second is that it allows one to read off a semantics for
modal sentences from the semantics of the corresponding non-modal sentences.
The actualist transformation-method allows actualists equipped with the dot-notation
to enjoy both of these advantages.
2. Characterizing Intensions
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On a standard way of doing intensional semantics for natural languages, character-
izing the semantic value of an expression calls for quantification over possibilia.15
Oversimplifying a bit, the semantic value of, e.g. ‘philosopher’ might be taken to
be the set of pairs 〈w, z〉 where w is a possible world and z is an (actual or merely
possible) individual who is a philosopher at w.
As emphasized in Lewis (1970), the Lewisian is able to do the job by quantifying
over Lewisian possibilia:
J‘philosopher’K = {〈w, z〉 : I(z, w) ∧ Phil(z)}
But the actualist transformation-method allows actualists armed with the dot-
notation to follow suit, by quantifying over a-worlds and ordered pairs:
J‘philosopher’K = {〈w, z〉 : [z˙ = z˙]w ∧ [Phil(z˙)]w}
or, equivalently,
J‘philosopher’K = {〈w, z〉 : [Phil(z˙)]w}.
Since the actualist transformation-method preserves inferential connections, the ac-
tualist semantics is guaranteed to deliver the same theorems as its Lewisian coun-
terpart. And since the transformation-method preserves truth-value the actualist’s
axioms will be true just in case their Lewisian counterparts would count as true
from the perspective of the Lewisian.
In particular, one can expect the actualist semantics to deliver every instance of
the (world-relative) T-schema. For instance:
True(‘∃xPhil(x)’, w)↔ ([∃xPhil(x)]w)
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or, equivalently,
True(‘∃xPhil(x)’, w)↔ ∃x([Phil(x˙)]w)
(Read: The object-language sentence ‘∃xPhil(x)’ is true at admissible a-
world w just in case there is an individual which is used by w to represent
a philosopher.)
2.7 Limitations of the proposal
A-worlds are subject to an important limitation.16 Whereas differences between a-worlds
are no more fine-grained than is required to make distinctions expressible in one’s lan-
guage, there might be differences amongst Lewisian worlds too fine-grained to be ex-
pressed in one’s language.17
Because of this limitation, some of the metaphysical work that the Lewisian gets out
of Lewisian possibilia cannot be replicated by an actualist equipped with the dot-notion.
Here is an example. Lewis (1986) treats properties as sets of worldbound individuals. Up
to a certain point, the actualist is able to follow suit. When the Lewisian claims that the
property of being a philosopher is to be identified with the set of philosophers inhabiting
actual or non-actual Lewisian worlds, for instance, the actualist could claim that the set
{〈z, w〉 : [Phil(z˙)]w} is to be used as a surrogate for the property of being a philosopher.
But the strategy breaks down when it comes to properties making finer distinctions than
can be expressed in one’s language.18
In general, whether or not the actualist’s limitation turns out to get in the way will
depend on whether the job at hand calls for using possibilia to make finer distinctions
than can be expressed in one’s language. When the job at hand is a piece of semantic
theorizing the extra resources are unnecessary: since a semantic theory is ultimately an
effort to explain how language is used, it need not be concerned with distinctions too
fine-grained to figure in our explanations. But when the job at hand is metaphysical
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reduction, matters are otherwise.19
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Appendices
A A semantics
I give a formal semantics for a language Lw which allows for empty names and contains
both the intensional operator [. . .]w (read ‘according to w, . . . ’) and the dot-notation.
Lw consists of the following symbols:
1. for n > 0, the n-place (non-modal) predicate letters: pFn1q, pFn2q, . . . (each with an
intended interpretation);
2. for n > 0, the one-place modal predicate letter pBnq (each with an intended inter-
pretation);
3. the identity symbol ‘=’;
4. for n > 0, the individual non-empty constant-letter pcnq (each with an intended
referent);
5. for n > 0, the individual empty constant-letter penq;
6. the individual constant ‘α’
7. the dot ‘˙’;
8. the monadic sentential operator ‘[. . .]’;
9. the monadic sentential operator ‘¬’;
10. the dyadic sentential operator ‘∧’;
11. the quantifier-symbol ‘∃’;
12. the modal variables: ‘w’, ‘v’ ‘u’ with or without numerical subscripts;
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13. the non-modal variables: ‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’ with or without numerical subscripts;
14. the auxiliaries ‘(’ and ‘)’.
Undotted terms and formulas are defined as follows:
1. any modal variable is an undotted modal term;
2. ‘α’ is an undotted modal term;
3. any non-modal variable or individual constant-letter is an undotted non-modal
term;
4. if τ1, . . . , τn are undotted non-modal terms, then pFni (τ1, . . . , τn)q is an undotted
formula;
5. if τ1 and τ2 are either both undotted non-modal terms or both undotted modal
terms, then pτ1 = τ2q is an undotted formula;
6. if w is an undotted modal term, then pBi(w)q is an undotted formula;
7. if φ is an undotted formula and w is an undotted modal term, then p[φ]wq is an
undotted formula;
8. if v is an undotted (modal or non-modal) variable and φ is an undotted formula,
then p∃v(φ)q is an undotted formula;
9. if φ and ψ are undotted formulas, then p¬φq and p(φ ∧ ψ)q are undotted formulas;
10. nothing else is an undotted term or formula.
A non-modal term is either an undotted non-modal term or the result of dotting a
non-modal variable; a modal term is an undotted modal term; a formula is the result of
dotting any free or externally bounded occurrences of non-modal variables in an undotted
formula.20
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Next, we characterize the notion of an a-world and of a variable assignment. An
a-world is a pair 〈D, I〉 with the following features:
1. D is a set of individuals in the range of the non-modal variables, each of which is
either of the form 〈x, ‘actual’〉 or of the form 〈x, ‘nonactual’〉.21
2. I is a function assigning a subset of D to each 1-place predicate-letter, and a subset
of Dn to each n-place predicate letter (for n < 1). In addition, if e is an empty
name, I may or may not assign a referent to e (and if a referent is assigned, it may
or may not be in D).
The actualized a-world 〈Dα, Iα〉 will be singled out for special attention. Dα is the set of
pairs 〈z, ‘actual’〉 for z an individual in the range of the non-modal variables; and Iα(‘Fnj ’)
is the set of sequences 〈〈z1, ‘actual’〉 , . . . 〈zn, ‘actual’〉〉 such tha z1 . . . zn are in the range
of the non-modal variables and satisfy F .
A variable assignment is a function σ with the following features:
1. σ assigns an a-world to each modal variable.
2. σ assigns an individual to each non-modal variable.
This puts us in a position to characterize notions of quasi-denotation and quasi-satisfaction.
(With a suitable notion of admissibility is on board, one can characterize truth and sat-
isfaction for Lw. Satisfaction is the special case of quasi-satisfaction in which attention
is restricted to admissible a-worlds, and truth is the special case of quasi-truth in which
attention is restricted to admissible a-worlds.) For v a non-modal variable, σ a variable
assignment, φ a formula and w an a-world, we characterize the quasi-denotation func-
tion δσ,w(v) and the quasi-satisfaction predicate Sat(φ, σ). In addition, we characterize
an auxiliary (a-world-relative) quasi-satisfaction predicate Sat(φ, σ, w). We proceed ax-
iomatically, by way of the following clauses:
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• If v is a (modal or non-modal) variable, δσ,w(v) is σ(v);
• If v is a non-modal variable, w is an a-world and σ(v) is an ordered pair of the
form 〈z, ‘actual’〉, then δσ,w(pv˙q) is the first member of σ(v); otherwise δσ,w(pv˙q) is
undefined;
• if c is a non-empty constant-letter and w is an a-world, δσ,w(c) is the intended
referent of c.
• if e is an empty constant-letter and w is an a-world, δσ,w(e) is the w-referent of e if
there is one, and is otherwise undefined;
• δσ,w(‘α’) is 〈Dα, Iα〉;
• if τ1 and τ2 are terms (both of them modal or both of them non-modal) and neither
of them is an empty constant-letter, then Sat(pτ1 = τ2)q, σ) if and only if δσ,w(τ1) =
δσ,w(τ2) for arbitrary w;
• if τ1 and τ2 are non-modal terms at least one of which is an empty constant-letter,
then not-Sat(pτ1 = τ2)q, σ);
• if τ1, . . . τn are non-modal terms none of which is an empty constant-letter, then
Sat(pFni (τ1, . . . , τn)q, σ) if and only if F ni (δσ,w(τ1), . . . , δσ,w(τn)), where w is arbi-
trary and pFni q is intended to express F ni -ness;
• if τ1, . . . τn are non-modal terms at least one of which is an empty constant-letter,
then not-Sat(pFni (τ1, . . . , τn)q, σ);
• if v is a modal variable, Sat(pBi(v)q, σ) if and only if Bi(δσ,w(v)) for arbitrary w,
where Bi is intended to express Bi-ness;
• if v is a non-modal variable, Sat(p∃v(φ)q, σ) if and only if there is an individual z
in the range of the non-modal variables such that Sat(pφq, σv/z), where σv/z is just
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like σ except that it assigns z to v;
• if v is a modal variable, Sat(p∃v(φ)q, σ) if and only if there is an a-world z such
that Sat(pφq, σv/z), where σv/z is just like σ except that it assigns z to v;
• Sat(p¬φq, σ) if and only if it is not the case that Sat(φ, σ);
• Sat(pφ ∧ ψq, σ) if and only if Sat(φ, σ) and Sat(ψ, σ);
• Sat(p[φ]wq, σ) if and only if Sat(φ, σ′, σ(w)), where σ′(x) = σ(x) for x a modal
variable and σ′(x) = 〈σ(x), ‘actual’〉 for x a non-modal variable;
• if τ1 and τ2 are non-modal terms neither of which is an empty constant-letter
without a w-reference, then Sat(pτ1 = τ2)q, σ, w) if and only if δσ,w(τ1) is in the
domain of w and is identical to δσ,w(τ2);
• if τ1 and τ2 are non-modal terms at least one of which is a constant-letter without
a w-reference, then not-Sat(pτ1 = τ2)q, σ, w);
• if τ1 and τ2 are modal terms, then Sat(pτ1 = τ2)q, σ, w) if and only if δσ,w(τ1) =
δσ,w(τ2) for arbitrary w;
• if τ1, . . . τn are non-modal terms none of which is a constant-letter without a w-
reference, then Sat(pFni (τ1, . . . , τn)q, σ, w) if and only if 〈δσ,w(τ1), . . . , δσ,w(τn)〉 is in
the w-extension of pFni q;
• if τ1, . . . τn are non-modal terms at least one of which is a constant-letter without
a w-reference, then not-Sat(pFni (τ1, . . . , τn)q, σ, w);
• if v is a modal term, Sat(pBi(v)q, σ, w) if and only if Bi(δσ,w(v)), where pBiq is
intended to express Bi-ness;
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• if v is a non-modal variable, Sat(p∃v(φ)q, σ, w) if and only if there is an individual
z in the domain of w such that Sat(pφq, σv/z, w), where σv/z is just like σ except
that it assigns z to v;
• if v is a modal variable, Sat(p∃v(φ)q, σ, w) if and only if there is an a-world z such
that (a) any empty constant-letter which is assigned a referent by w is assigned the
same referent by z, and (b) Sat(pφq, σv/z, w), where σv/z is just like σ except that
it assigns z to v;
• Sat(p¬φq, σ, w) if and only if it is not the case that Sat(φ, σ, w);
• Sat(pφ ∧ ψq, σ, w) if and only if Sat(φ, σ, w) and Sat(ψ, σ, w);
• Sat(p[φ]uq, σ, w) if and only if Sat(φ, σ, σ(u)).
Finally, we say that a formula φ is quasi-true if and only if Sat(φ, σ) for any variable
assignment σ.
B A transformation
The purpose of this appendix is to explain how the transformation from Lewisian sen-
tences to dotted actualist sentences works in general. I shall assume that the Lewisian
language is a two-sorted first-order languages, with world-variables ‘w1’, ‘w2’, etc. ranging
over Lewisian worlds, and individual-variables ‘x1’, ‘x2’, etc. ranging over world-bound
individuals in the Lewisian pluriverse. The language contains no function-letters; there
is a world-constant ‘α’ referring to the actual Lewisian world and individual-constants
‘c1’, ‘c2’, etc. referring to world-bound individuals. The only atomic predicates are ‘I’
(which takes an individual-variable and a world-variable), ‘C’ (which takes two individual-
variables), ‘=’ (which takes (i) two world-variables, (ii) two individual-variables, (iii) a
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world-constant and a world-variable, or (iv) an individual-constant and an individual-
variable) and, for each j, pPnj q (which takes n individual-variables). (If one likes, one
can also take the language to contain set-theoretic vocabulary.) Finally, I shall assume
that universal quantifiers are defined in terms of existential quantifiers in the usual way,
and that logical connectives other than ‘∧’ and ‘¬’ are defined in terms of ‘∧’ and ‘¬’ in
the usual way.
The plan is to proceed in two steps. The first is to get the Lewisian sentence into
a certain kind of normal form; the second is to convert the normal-form sentence into
a dotted actualist sentence. Here is a recipe for getting an arbitrary Lewisian sentence
into normal form:
1. Start by relabeling variables in such a way that no world-variable has the same
index as an individual-variable;
2. next, replace each occurrence of pI(xj, wk)q by pwj = wkq;
3. then replace each occurrence of the atomic formula pPnj (xk1 , . . . , xkn)q by
(Pnj (xk1 , . . . , xkn) ∧ wk1 = wk2 ∧ . . . ∧ wk1 = wkn),
each occurrence of pcj = xkq by p(cj = xk ∧ α = wk)q, and each occurrence of
pxj = xkq by p(xj = xk ∧ wj = wk)q.22
4. finally, replace each occurrence of p∃xj(. . .)q by p∃xj∃wj(I(xj, wj) ∧ . . .)q.
On the assumption that pPnj q is projectable (and, hence, that pPnj (xk1 , . . . , xkn)q can only
be true if xk1 , . . . , xkn are world-mates), it is easy to verify that this procedure respects
truth-value. (For a characterization of projectability, see footnote 13.)
Here is an example. The Lewisian sentence
∃w17∃x2∃x5(I(x2, w17) ∧ Sister(x2, x5))
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(Read: There is a Lewisian world w17 an individual x2 and an individual x5
such that x2 is an inhabitant of w17 and x2 has x5 as a sister.)
gets rewritten as:
∃w17∃x2∃w2(I(x2, w2)∧∃x5∃w5(I(x5, w5)∧w2 = w17∧Sister(x2, x5)∧w2 = w5))
(Read: There is a Lewisian world w17, an individual x2 inhabiting Lewisian
world w2, and an individual x5 inhabiting Lewisian world w5 such that w2 is
identical to w17, x2 has x5 as a sister and w2 is identical to w5.)
Once one has a Lewisian sentence in normal form, it can be transformed into a dotted
actualist sentence by carrying out the following replacements:
I(xj, wj) −→ [∃y(y = x˙j)]wj
Pnj (xk1 , . . . , xkn) −→ [Pnj (x˙k1 , . . . , x˙kn)]wk1
C(xj, xk) −→ xj = xk
cj = xk −→ [cj = x˙k]wk
Here is an example. The Lewisian rendering of ‘♦(∃x1∃x2 Sister(x1, x2))’ is
∃w3∃x1∃x2(I(x1, w3) ∧ I(x2, w3) ∧ Sister(x1, x2))
whose normal form
∃w3∃x1∃w1(I(x1, w1) ∧ ∃x2∃w2(I(x2, w2) ∧ w1 = w3 ∧ w1 = w3∧
Sister(x1, x2) ∧ w1 = w2))
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gets transformed by the actualist into
∃w3∃x1∃w1([∃y(y = x˙1)]w1 ∧ ∃x2∃w2([∃y(y = x˙2)]w2 ∧ w1 = w3 ∧ w1 = w3∧
[Sister(x˙1, x˙2)]w1 ∧ w1 = w2))
which boils down to:
∃w3∃x1∃x2([Sister(x˙1, x˙2)]w3)
(Read: There is are objects x1 and x2 and an admissible a-world w such that
x1 and x2 are used by w to represent someone’s having a sister.)
and is guaranteed by the Appendix A semantics to be equivalent to
∃w3([∃x1∃x2 Sister(x1, x2)]w3)
(Read: There is an admissible a-world w according to which there are indi-
viduals x1 and x2 such that x1 has x2 as a sister.)
which is the actualist’s rendering of ‘♦(∃x1∃x2 Sister(x1, x2))’.
Here is a slightly more complex example. The actualist’s rendering of
There are possible worlds w1 and w2 with the following properties: according
to w1, there is an individual who is my sister and a philosopher; according to
w2, that very individual is a cellist rather than a philosopher.
is
∃w4∃w5∃x1∃x2∃x3(
I(x1, w4)∧I(x2, w4) ∧ I(x3, w5)∧
∃x6(ar = x6 ∧ C(x6, x1)) ∧ C(x2, x3)∧
Sister(x1, x2) ∧ Phil(x2) ∧ Cellist(x3) ∧ ¬Phil(x3))
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whose normal form
∃w4∃w5∃x1∃w1(I(x1, w1) ∧ ∃x2∃w2(I(x2, w2)∧∃x3∃w3(I(x3, w4)∧
w1 = w4 ∧ w2 = w4 ∧ w3 = w5∧
∃x6∃w6(I(x6, w6) ∧ ar = x6 ∧ α = w6 ∧ C(x6, x1)) ∧ C(x2, x3)∧
Sister(x1, x2) ∧ Phil(x2) ∧ Cellist(x3) ∧ ¬Phil(x3))))
gets transformed by the actualist into
∃w4∃w5∃x1∃w1([∃y(y = x˙1)]w1 ∧ ∃x2∃w2([∃y(y = x˙2)]w2 ∧ ∃x3∃w3([∃y(y = x˙3)]w3∧
w1 = w4 ∧ w2 = w4 ∧ w3 = w5∧
∃x6∃w6([∃y(y = x˙6)]w6 ∧ [ar = x˙6]w6 ∧ α = w6 ∧ x6 = x1) ∧ x2 = x3∧
[Sister(x˙1, x˙2)]w1 ∧ w1 = w2 ∧ [Phil(x˙2)]w2 ∧ [Cellist(x˙3)]w3 ∧ ¬[Phil(x˙3)]w3)))
which boils down to
∃w4∃w5∃x2([Sister(ar, x˙2)]w4 ∧ [Phil(x˙2)]w4 ∧ [Cellist(x˙2)]w5 ∧ [¬Phil(x˙2)]w5)
(Read: there are admissible a-worlds w4 and w5 and an individual x2 such that: (i) x2 is
used by w4 to represent my sister and a philosopher, and (ii) x2 is used by w5 to represent
a cellist rather than a philosopher.)
Finally, we show that there is a notion of a-world admissibility which guarantees that
the actualist transformation of an arbitrary Lewisian sentence has the truth-value that
the Lewisian sentence would receive on its intended interpretation. (The proof relies on
the assumption that the Lewisian language is rich enough—and the space of Lewisian
worlds varied enough with respect to predicates occurring in the language—that the set of
true sentences has a model in which any two worlds are such that some atomic predicate
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is satisfied by a sequence of objects inhabiting one of the worlds, but not by the result
of replacing each object in the sequence by its counterpart in the other world.) Start by
enriching the Lewisian language with a standard name for each inhabitant of the actual
world, and let S be the set of true sentences in the extended language. One can use
the Completeness Theorem to generate a model M of S in which the domain consists of
‘=’-equivalence classes of terms and in which the assumption above is satisfied. If a1 is
an object in the individual-variable domain of M , let a∗1 be the set of individuals a2 such
that ‘C(x1, x2)’ is satisfied by a1 and a2. (I assume that ‘C’ is an equivalence relation, and
therefore that ∗ partitions the individual-variable domain of M into equivalence classes.)
If a1 is an object in the individual-variable domain of M , let a
† be 〈z, ‘actual’〉 if the
standard name of z is in the transitive closure of a∗, and 〈a∗, ‘nonactual’〉 otherwise.
For each c in the world-variable domain of M , we construct an a-world wc, as follows:
the domain of wc is the set of a
† such that ‘I(x1, w1)’ is satisfied by a and c in M ; the
wc extension of pPnj q is the set of sequences
〈
a†1, . . . , a
†
n
〉
such that ‘I(x1, w1) ∧ . . . ∧
I(xn, w1) ∧ Pnj (x1 . . . , xn)’ is satisfied by a1, . . . , an, c in M . In addition we let individual
constants receive their intended interpretations, and let ‘α’ be wc, where c is the M -
referent of ‘α’. Say that an a-world is admissible just in case it is a wc for some c in
the world-variable domain of M . If σ is a variable-assignment function in M , let σ† be
such that σ†(pxjq) is σ(pxjq)†, σ†(pwjq) is wc if pxjq occurs in φ (where c is such that
‘I(x1, w1)’ is satisfied by σ(pxjq) and c in M), and σ†(pwjq) is wσ(pwjq) if pxjq does not
occur in φ. An induction on the complexity of formulas shows that a Lewisian formula φ
is satisfied by an assignment function σ in M just in case the actualist transformation of
its normal form is satisfied by σ† when the world-variables range over admissible a-worlds
and the individual-variables range over the union of the domains of admissible a-worlds.
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Notes
1See, for instance, Plantinga (1976) and chapter 3 of Lewis (1986). A recent ersatzist
proposal is discussed in Fine (2002) and Sider (2002) (but embraced only by Sider).
The sort of proposal that Fine and Sider discuss has a more ambitious objective than the
proposal developed here, since it is intended to capture finer-grained distinctions amongst
possibilities. It also relies on more substantial expressive and ontological resources. (It
relies, in particular, on an infinitary language and an ontology of properties.)
2By emulating the benefits of quantification over sets of possibilia the proposal also
allows us to go some way towards addressing the expressive limitations identified in
chapter 7 of Williamson (2010). In particular, one can use the dot-notation introduced
in section 2.4 to express a version of the claim that incpompossible objects form a set:
∃α∃x∃y(α = {x, y} ∧ ♦(∃z(z = x˙)) ∧ ♦(∃z(z = y˙)) ∧ ¬♦(∃z∃v(z = x˙ ∧ v = y˙))).
3See McMichael (1983).
4Lewis (1986), p. 194. (Lewis writes ‘genuine’ where I have substituted ‘Lewisian’.)
Lewis takes the counterpart relation to be context-dependent, but here I shall treat it as
constant for the sake of simplicity. Also for the sake of simplicity, I shall assume that the
counterpart relation is an equivalence.
5It is worth emphasizing that by availing oneself of an ontology of Lewisian worlds
and a Lewisian counterpart relation one does not immediately do any better. What one
gets is a way of making clear when two Lewisian worlds are to be counted as linked,
not a characterization of linking. A friend of the Lewisian ontology can, however, give
a proper characterization of linking by making an additional reductionist claim; namely,
that there is no more to possibility than the existence of the relevant representation.
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There is, for example, no more to the fact that I might have had a sister than the fact
that someone who is like me in certain respects has a sister.
6I assume, for simplicity, that the accessibility relation is trivial.
7More precisely, what one can show is this: provided there is a determinate fact of the
matter about which sentences of L♦ are true, there is a notion of admissibility relative
to which an a-worlds semantics assigns the right truth-value to every sentence in L♦. (I
assume that the first-order language L on which L♦ is based has a set-sized domain, and a
name for every object in this domain.) Proof: Where S is the set of true sentences in L♦,
use Kripke’s completeness theorem for modal languages to construct a Kripke-model for S
in which the domain consists of equivalence-classes of terms. Then transform the Kripke-
model into an a-world semantics by substituting the pair 〈x, ‘actual’〉 for each equivalence
class in the domain of the actual world of the Kripke-semantics containing a name for
x, and the pair 〈x, ‘nonactual’〉 for each object x in the domain of some non-actual
world of the Kripke-semantics but not in the domain of the actual world of the Kripke-
semantics. (The proof relies on the reasonable assumption that S is consistent relative
to a normal logic. To avoid talking about accessibility relations, I have also assumed
that S is consistent relative to S5. It is worth noting that—unless one assumes that the
language is countable—the Completeness Theorem assumes a weak version of the Axiom
of Choice, so the resulting characterization of admissibility will be non-constructive.)
8On the Principle of Recombination, see Lewis (1986) §1.8. For other approaches to
grounding admissibility see Fine (1994) and Peacocke (1999), ch. 4.
9For a sparse conception of possible worlds, see Stalnaker’s ‘On what there isn’t (but
might have been)’. Stalnaker makes clear that he does not see sparseness as an obstacle
for doing Kripke-semantics.
10See Plantinga (1976). For a critique of Plantinga, see Fine (1985).
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11Keep in mind that self-identity may be used as an existence predicate.
12If the accessibility relation is non-trivial, what one gets is the following instead:
[[φ]w]w′ ↔ ([φ]w ∧ Acccessible(w′, w)).
13 When I say that the transformation preserves truth-value what I mean is that there
is a notion of a-world admissibility which guarantees that the actualist transformation of
an arbitrary Lewisian sentence is true just in case the original Lewisian sentence would
count as true from the perspective of the Lewisian. When I say that the transformation
preserves inferential role, what I mean is that a Lewisian sentence φ follows from a set of
Lewisian sentences Γ just in case φ’s transformation follows from the the transformations
of sentences in Γ.
The result assumes that atomic predicates in the Lewisian’s language other than ‘I’,
‘C’ and ‘=’ (and any set-theoretic vocabulary) be projectable. For a monadic predicate
P to be projectable is for it to be the case that a Lewisian world represents a possibility
whereby something is P by containing an inhabitant who is P . (And similarly for many-
place predicates.) Thus, ‘Philosopher’ is projectable because a Lewisian world represents
a possibility whereby something is a philosopher by containing an inhabitant who is
a philosopher; but ‘inhabits a Lewisian world which is part of a pluriverse containing
many Lewisian worlds’ is not projectable because a Lewisian world does not represent
a possibility whereby something inhabits a Lewisian world which is part of a pluriverse
containing many Lewisian worlds by containing an inhabitant who inhabits a Lewisian
world which is part of a pluriverse containing many Lewisian worlds.
14As Lewis observes, a feature of the 1968 translation is that ‘∀x(∃y(x = y))’ turns
out to be true. For this reason, I prefer a modification of the translation whereby
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(φ)β is ∀β1(W (β1) → (φ)β1), (♦φ)β is ∃β1(W (β1) ∧ (φ)β1) and (P (x1, . . . , xn))β is
∃γ1 . . . ∃γn(I(γ1, β) ∧ C(γ1, x1) ∧ . . . I(γn, β) ∧ C(γn, xn) ∧ P (γ1 . . . , γn) (for P atomic).
The modified translation delivers the same truth-values as a version of Kripke-semantics
in which atomic formulas (including identity-statements) can only be satisfied at a world
by objects that exist at that world.
15For a representative textbook, see Heim and Kratzer (1998), ch. 12.
16For discussion of related issues, see Lewis (1986) §3.1. It is worth noting that Lewis’s
critique is not meant to apply to the sort of project that is the focus of the present essay.
Here is Lewis: “When I complain, as I shall, that there are various ways for different
possibilities to get conflated in their linguistic descriptions, that may be harmless when
we want to use ersatz possibilia to characterize the content of thought for a subject
who has no way to distinguish the conflated possibilities in his perception and conduct.”
(p. 144, footnote).
17More precisely, there might be different Lewisian worlds such that every inhabitant
of the one world is a counterpart of an inhabitant of the other, and every predicate in
the language which is projectable in the sense of footnote 13 is satisfied by inhabitants of
one world just in case it is satisfied by the counterparts of those individuals at the other.
The distinct possibilities represented by such Lewisian worlds would both be compatible
with the less-specific possibility represented by an a-world in which the behavior of the
predicates mirrors the behavior of the predicates at the Lewisian worlds.
18Any set of worldbound individuals containing an inhabitant of one of the Lewisian
worlds described in footnote 17 but not its counterpart at the other corresponds to a
Lewisian property with no actualist surrogate.
19For their many helpful comments, I am grateful to Elizabeth Barnes, Ross Cameron,
Michael Glanzberg, Ephraim Glick, Caspar Hare, Sally Haslanger, Allen Hazen, Michael
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Rescorla, Graham Priest, Peter Simons, Bob Stalnaker, Robbie Williams, Steve Yablo,
audiences at the University of Leeds, the University of Melbourne and MIT’s Work in
Progress Seminar, and especially to two helpful referees for Cr´ıtica.
20An occurrence of a non-modal variable in an undotted formula is free iff it is not
bound by a quantifier; an occurrence of a non-modal variable in an undotted formula is
externally bounded iff it is bound by a quantifier which is not within the scope of ‘[. . .]’.
21I assume that D is a set for the sake of simplicity. The assumption can be avoided
by characterizing the notion of an a-world in second-order terms. This can be done by
employing the technique in Rayo and Uzquiano (1999).
22These three replacements are needed to secure the base clause in the induction below.
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